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Abstract 
 Calvinist jurist Johannes Althusius (1557-1638) developed what he called a 
“universal theory” of law and politics for war-torn Europe.  He called for written 
constitutions that separated the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of cities, 
provinces, nations, and empires alike and that guaranteed the natural rights and 
liberties of all subjects.  To be valid, he argued, these constitutions had to respect the 
universal natural law set out in Christian and classical, biblical and rational teachings of 
law, authority, and rights.  To be effective, these constitutions had to recognize the 
symbiotic nature of human beings who are born with a dependence on God and 
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associations to maintain liberty and community.  Althusius left a comprehensive 
Christian theory of rule of law and political that anticipated many of the arguments of 
later Enlightenment theorists of social and government contracts. 
 Keywords: Johannes Althusius; written constitutions; symbiosis; natural law; 
natural rights; separation of powers; covenant; contract. 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In The Hebrew Republic: Jewish Sources and the Transformation of European 
Political Thought, Harvard historian Eric Nelson sharply criticizes the ‘standard 
narrative’ of seventeenth-century political history. The standard narrative describes this 
as a century devoted to the separation of religion and politics and to the construction of 
a secular order built on ‘pagan classical’ learning, Machiavellian politics, and early 
Enlightenment liberalism. This is largely a ‘myth’, Nelson argues, propounded by post-
modern secularists. The reality is that the seventeenth century saw ‘the full fervor of the 
Reformation unleashed’, and ‘political theology’ made very much part of ‘the 
mainstream of European intellectual life’. It was in this overtly religious milieu that the 
West built many of its cardinal institutions of confederation, human rights, constitutional 
order, popular sovereignty, democratic politics, and rule of law. Protestant theological 
jurisprudence, Catholic political theory and canon law, and Jewish biblical thought, says 
Nelson, were just as critical to the modern Western political project as the purportedly 
secular theories of Machiavelli or Hobbes.2  
My interest has been to excavate some of the early modern Protestant 
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the Western legal and political tradition.3 In this chapter, I focus on the contributions of 
Calvinist jurist, Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), who served as professor and rector at 
the Herborn Academy, a new Calvinist college, from 1586 to 1604 before moving to 
Emden, an important seaport near the border of the Holy Roman Empire and the newly 
united Netherlands and a major Calvinist intellectual center. There he served as leader 
of church, state, and society for the rest of his life, while continuing to write 
voluminously.4 He was legal counsel for the city (Stadtsyndicus) and was deeply 
involved in the city’s multiple legal, commercial, and diplomatic negotiations.5 He played 
a leading role in helping Emden wrest greater independence from the local territorial 
count and nobles, which gave him a small taste of international diplomacy, but nothing 
on the order of jurists like Hugo Grotius.  
Althusius was ‘the clearest and most profound thinker which Calvinism has 
produced in the realm of political science and jurisprudence’.6 Unlike other figures 
covered in this volume, and other Calvinists of his day, Althusius wrote little original 
about the moral character of the good ruler or the nature of international law, and he 
said almost nothing about China or Asia. What commends his work for this volume is 
that he wrote a great deal about a ‘universal law’ rooted in divine commandments and 
natural laws that were binding on rulers and subjects alike. This universal law, he further 
argued, was to be adapted and adopted in written constitutions forged for each political 




3 See J Witte Law and Protestantism: The Legal Teachings of the Lutheran Reformation (Cambridge 
University Press, 2002); J Witte God’s Joust, God’s Justice: Law and Religion in the Western Tradition 
(Wm. B. Eerdmans, 2006); J Witte From Sacrament to Contract: Marriage, Religion, and Law in the 
Western Tradition (2nd edn, Westminster John Knox Press, 2011); J Witte and Joel A Nichols Religion and 
the American Constitutional Experiment (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 2016).  
4 See Erik Wolf Grosse Rechtsdenker der deutschen Geistesgeschichte (4th edn, Mohr, 1963) 177–219. 
5 See, eg, Recess vnd Accord-buch, das ist, Zusamen Verfassung aller Ordnung[en], Decreten, 
Recessen, Accorden, und Verträgen, so zwischen ... Herrn Edtzarden vnd Herrn Johan ... Herrn vnd 
Graffen zu Ostfrieszlandt (Emden Kallenbach, 1612, 1656).  
6 Carl J Friedrich ‘Introductory Remarks’ in Carl J Friedrich (ed) Politica Methodice Digesta of Johannes 









the executive, legislative, and judicial powers of cities, provinces, nations, and empires 
alike and that guaranteed and enumerated the natural rights and liberties of all subjects. 
It was the universal law of God and nature together with the written constitutions of each 
community that constituted the ‘rule of law’ for Althusius.  
These themes come through in many of his two dozen books,7 but are especially 
prominent in his two most famous titles. His massive Politics of 1603 (revised in 1610 
and 1614) set forth a comprehensive theory of social, political, and legal order and 
activity, and the forms and norms of sovereignty, authority, and liberty that obtain within 
each sphere.8 His three-volume Theory of Justice (1617, 1618) laid the groundwork for 
a comprehensive theory of law and justice.9 Althusius presented these two tracts as 
‘comprehensive,’ ‘total,’ and ‘universal’ accounts of law and politics. Each tract drew on 
hundreds of scholarly sources—sundry ancient Greeks and Romans, various apostolic 
and patristic writers, numerous medieval theologians, philosophers, and civilians, a few 
canonists, various Protestant jurists, all manner of contemporary Catholic and 
Protestant political writers, especially from Salamanca, and several collections of civil, 
imperial, feudal, and urban law. There was good reason for this intense eclecticism. 
Althusius was writing for the ages, not just for his own age. By copiously combing and 
combining the insights of sundry Jewish, Greek, Roman, and Christian sources, he 
sought to create what he called a ‘total’ and ‘universal’ theory that would appeal not only 
to fellow Calvinists and countrymen but to anyone in his world of Christendom who was 




7 See Dieter Wyduckel ‘Einleitung, Literaturverzeichnis’ in Johannes Althusius, Politik Dieter Wyduckel 
(ed) Heinrich Janssen (tr) (Duncker & Humblot, 2003), vii-lxxxii. 
8 I have used the 1614 Friedrich edition and adapted the English translation: Politica Johannes Althusius, 
FS Carney (ed) (tr) (Liberty Fund, 1995) [hereafter Pol.]  See further Johannes Althusius, Civilis 
conversationis libri duo recogniti et aucti. Methodice digesti et exemplis sacris et profanis passim illustrati 
(Hanau Hanoviae Antonius, 1601) [hereafter Civ. Conv.]. 
9 Johannes Althusius, Dicaeologicae libri tres, totum et universum Jus, quo utimur, methodice 









Althusius built his system on two main foundations, which I take up in the next 
two sections: (1) a ‘demonstrative theory’ of universal natural law that focused on the 
concordance between Christian and classical, biblical and rational teachings of law, 
authority, and rights; and (2) ‘a symbiotic theory of human nature’ that focused on the 
natural and necessary attachments of the person to God, neighbor, and society, 
including especially the role of covenantal political associations in maintaining human 
liberty and community.10  
 
DEMONSTRATIVE THEORY OF NATURAL LAW  
 
In working out his legal theory, Althusius sought to demonstrate the ultimate 
concordance between biblical and rational, Christian and classical teachings on the 
nature and purpose of law. Civil law and canon law jurists of his day typically 
distinguished three main types of law: (1) the natural law or law of nature (ius naturale, 
lex naturae), the set of immutable principles of reason and conscience that are supreme 
in authority and divinity; (2) the law of nations or common law (ius gentium, ius 
commune, lex communis), the legal principles and procedures that are common to 
multiple political communities and often the basis for treaties and other diplomatic 
conventions; and (3) the civil law or positive law (ius civile, ius positivum), the statutes, 
customs, and cases of various states, churches, fiefdoms, manors, and other local 
political communities.11 Theologians and moralists, in turn, generally distinguished three 
main types of biblical law: (1) moral law (lex moralis), the enduring moral teachings of 
the Decalogue and the New Testament; (2) juridical or forensic law (lex juridicales, ius 
forensi), the rules and procedures by which ancient Israelites and apostolic Christians 
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ceremonialis), the Mosaic laws of personal diet, ritual sacrifice, priestly life, and the like 
that governed the religious life of the ancient Israelites. Some theologians saw parallels 
between these three ancient types of biblical law and the three layers of modern 
Catholic and Protestant church law that governed, respectively, the essentials of 
doctrine and morality, the commonplaces of ecclesiastical polity and property, and the 
discretionary aspects (the adiaphora) of local church life.12  
Althusius’s mature legal theory collapsed these sundry hierarchies of law into two 
main types: natural laws and positive laws. And he subsumed most of the other 
traditional types of law within these two categories. He treated the moral laws of the 
Bible and the common laws of nations as two visible forms of the same invisible natural 
law hidden within each person’s reason and conscience. And, he regarded the laws of 
ancient Israelites and of modern churches as two types of positive law that stood 
alongside the positive laws of historical and modern states. The modern validity of all 
these positive laws turned on their concordance with the natural law. Their modern 
utility for any polity turned on their compliance with the fundamental law (lex 
fundamentalis) of the community.  
Natural law is ‘the will of God for men’, Althusius argued. God has ‘written this 
natural law’ on the hearts, souls, minds, and consciences of all persons, as Romans 
2:15 and sundry other biblical and classical sources make clear. Everyone, by his or her 
very nature, thus has the ‘ideas (notitiae) and inclinations (inclinationes) of this natural 
law’ born within them. Some of these ‘natural inclinations’ are common to humans and 
animals. Like animals, humans by nature are inclined to ‘preserve their lives and to 
procure the necessities to remain alive’. They are inclined to defend themselves against 
force and force majeure. They are inclined to ally themselves with others and to rally 
around natural leaders to aid them in their self-defense. They are inclined to ‘procreate 
by the union of male and female and to educate their natural-born children.’ They are 
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ailing. Self-preservation, self-protection, and self-perpetuation are ‘natural inclinations’ 
that the natural law teaches to persons and animals alike.13  
The natural law also teaches persons higher ideas that appeal uniquely to human 
reason and conscience, Althusius argued. By them, ‘a man understands what justice is, 
and is impelled by this hidden natural instinct to do what is just and to avoid what is 
unjust.’ Through the natural law, God commands all persons to ‘live a life that is at once 
pious and holy, just and proper’. God teaches them the natural ‘duties of love that are to 
be performed toward God and one’s neighbor.’ He sets out the basic ‘rules of living, 
obeying, and administering’ that must govern all persons and associations. He sets forth 
‘general principles of goodness and equity, evil and sinfulness’ that every man must 
know in order to live with himself and with others. He teaches the ‘actions and 
omissions that are appropriate to maintaining the public good of human society’ as well 
as the private good of households and families. By the natural law, Althusius wrote in 
final summary of his position, God  
teaches and writes on human hearts the general principles of 
goodness, equity, evil, and sin, and He instructs, induces, and 
incites all persons to do good and avoid evil. He likewise 
condemns the conscience of those who ignore these things 
and excuses those who do them. He thereby directs them to 
goodness and dissuades them from evil. If they follow the path 
of goodness, he excuses them. If they do not, he condemns 
them.14  
This natural law has had many names in the classical and Christian traditions, 
Althusius recognized—Godly law, divine law, moral law, natural law, natural justice, 
natural equity, the law of conscience, of the mind, of reason, or of right reason, the law 
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and others. Parsing the names for the natural law was not so important to Althusius. He 
regarded them mostly as synonyms and used them interchangeably.15  
Knowing the norms that the natural law teaches, applying them responsibly for 
the governance of self and others was the more important and the more difficult task. 
Althusius knew the traditional formula taught by the medieval scholastics and by the 
neo-scholastics of his day: that the natural law gives all persons an innate or natural 
knowledge of good and evil (called synderesis), that by exercising their reason persons 
can come to understand the norms of this natural law, and that by exercising their 
conscience they can learn to apply these norms equitably to concrete circumstances. 
But Althusius also recognized that, throughout history, persons and peoples have 
reached different formulations and applications of the natural law. Even in avowed 
Christian societies today, he wrote, persons have ‘different degrees of this [natural] 
knowledge and inclination. This law is not evidently inscribed equally on the hearts of 
all. The knowledge of it is communicated more abundantly to some and more sparingly 
to others, according to the will and judgment of God.’ So, given this reality, how can we 
really know ‘the nature of the norms of the law that are implanted in us by nature?’ How 
can we be absolutely certain that we as individuals, or as the leaders of our 
communities, have ‘a true perception’ of the contents of the natural law? How can we 
even know which person’s or community’s formulations of the natural law are better 
than another’s. How can we determine and distill those features of the natural law that 
should be part of a universal rule of law? Persons are fallible creatures who perceive 
natural law only ‘indirectly’, ‘circumstantially’, ‘through a glass darkly’, through ‘flickering 
shadows’ emitting from distant caves of light. Communities have widely variant 
‘customs, natures, attitudes, and viewpoints’ that are affected by the ‘age, condition, 
circumstances, and education’ of their members. There is no universal code of written 





15 Dic. 1.13.13–18; Dic. I.14; Pol. XXI.1–20.  









We can know the norms of the natural law if we study both Scripture and 
tradition, revelation and reason very carefully, Althusius argued. We know that God has 
given a fuller revelation of his law in the Bible, particularly in the Ten Commandments 
and in the moral teachings of Moses and the Prophets, Jesus and St. Paul. This cannot 
be a new form of natural law, for God would not and could not contradict the natural law 
that he already revealed to us in and through our human nature. Biblical moral law is 
rather a more perfect conformation and elaboration of the natural law ideas and 
inclinations that are already inscribed on the hearts and minds of everyone, believers 
and non-believers alike. Through Moses, God rewrote on stone what was already 
written on our hearts. Through Jesus, God rewrote this law anew by fulfilling its 
commandments and promises and by teaching his followers how to discern its 
‘weightier matters’. To be sure, Althusius acknowledged, biblical moral law has clearer 
precepts and higher purposes than any other form of natural law. It provides a more 
certain knowledge of the will of God for our lives. It sets out a pathway to salvation for 
those who can abide by its letter and a pathway to sanctification for those who can live 
by its spirit. But the Bible’s moral law only rewrites more copiously the natural law that is 
already written cryptically on the hearts of everyone.17  
While God and Scripture have rewritten the natural law for believers to discern, 
reason and experience have rewritten this natural law for non-believers to discover. In 
every major civilization, Althusius argued, enlightened leaders and magistrates have 
emerged who have used their natural reason to translate the general principles of 
natural law in their minds into specific positive or proper laws (leges positivum, leges 
propriae) for their communities. These enlightened leaders have inevitably tailored 
these positive laws to ‘the customs, nature, needs, attitudes, conditions, and other 
special circumstances’ of the people ruling and being ruled. This has produced widely 
variant positive laws over time and across cultures, particularly when these local laws 
are viewed in their details. But these enlightened leaders have also inevitably positioned 
these laws to reflect some of the natural light within their hearts, and have maintained 













laws that are common, even universal, to many peoples and polities, even those that 
have had no interaction with each other. Every major civilization, said Althusius, has 
developed comparable sets of law to govern religious worship and observance, to honor 
marriage and the family, to obey authorities and to respect traditions, to protect human 
lives, properties, and reputations, to care for relatives, widows, orphans, and the poor, 
to speak respectfully to others, to testify truthfully, to honor promises, contracts, and 
agreements, to vindicate wrongs and to punish wrongdoers, to fight wars and repel 
attacks, to give to each and everyone what is due. These common laws, independently 
developed by different peoples and polities over time and across cultures, must be 
regarded as ‘visible expressions of the same invisible natural law’ within all persons, 
Althusius argued. They must be taken as reflections of ‘the natural and divine 
immutable equity that is mixed into them’, as indications ‘of the common practice of 
natural law’.18  
These common laws (iura commune) or general laws of nations (iura gentium)—
gathered from the commonplaces of sundry positive laws and the common practices of 
sundry legal communities—stand alongside biblical moral laws as a second form and 
forum of natural law. Indeed, at a certain level of abstraction, the moral laws of the Bible 
and common laws of the nations converge, even though they have very different origins, 
ends, and languages. ‘A law is both natural and common’, Althusius wrote, ‘if the 
common use of right reason produces it for the necessity and utility of human social life. 
It, too, can then be called natural law.’  
While some distinguish among common law (ius commune), 
natural law (ius naturale), and the law of nations (ius gentium), 




18 Dic. 1.13.4–18; Dic. 1.14.1–14; Dic. I.35.22–23; Pol. VII.7–12; Pol. IX.20–21; Pol. X.3–12; Pol. 









natural law. ... Christ himself often called natural law things 
that are usually called the law of nations.19  
Althusius rested his case on the contents of the universal natural law most firmly 
on the confluence between the Commandments of the Decalogue and the moral 
teachings of sundry classical traditions. For him, the Decalogue was the clearest and 
most comprehensive confirmation and codification of the natural law, of every person’s 
inner natural inclinations to piety and justice, to faith and order, to love of God and love 
of neighbor. As such, ‘the Decalogue has been prescribed for all people to the extent 
that it agrees with and explains the common law of nature for all peoples’. ‘The precepts 
of the Decalogue ... infuse a vital spirit into the association and symbiotic life that we 
teach.’  
They carry a torch to guide the kind of social life that we 
desire; they prescribe and constitute a way, rule, guiding star, 
and boundary for human society. If anyone would take them 
out of politics, he would destroy it; indeed, he would destroy 
all symbiosis and social life among men. For what would 
human life be without the piety of the First Table and the 
justice of the Second [Table of the Decalogue]? What would 
a commonwealth be without the communion and 
communication of things useful and necessary to human 
life?20  
Every serious legal community thus has comparable positive laws dealing with 




19 Dic. I.13.11, 18–19. 
20 Pol., Preface (1610 and 1614 edn); Pol. XXI.29. See also Pol. VII.7–12; Pol. X.3–12; Pol. XVIII.32–44; 









crime, fidelity, contracts, evidence, and procedure that are reflected in the Ten 
Commandments.  
But beyond the Decalogue, not all biblical law should be taken as natural law, 
Althusius insisted, nor considered mandatory or even useful for modern times. Many of 
the Mosaic laws are simply the positive laws of the ancient Jewish people. Many of the 
legal actions and admonitions of the patriarchs, judges, and kings of ancient Israel are 
simply evidence of one positive law system in action. Particularly the Mosaic 
‘ceremonial’ laws and customs respecting diet, dress, sacrifice, ritual, levitical life, 
temple rules, and more, even though if they may have been authored by God, have no 
place in modern Christian or secular communities. At best, they serve as an illustration 
of how one legally sophisticated ancient community exercised its natural inclinations 
and obligations to religious worship and ritual life. While a modern day Christian 
magistrate would do well to develop a comparable set of ceremonial laws tailored to the 
needs of the local community, and perhaps even emulate some of the ancient biblical 
prototypes, he or she cannot simply ‘impose these Jewish positive laws, which by their 
nature are changeable and obsolete’. That would be to ‘destroy Christian liberty’.21  
More useful in our day, for Christian and non-Christian polities alike, are the 
‘juridical laws’ of Moses. These are the many detailed laws and procedures set out in 
the Bible to govern crime and tort, marriage and family, property and commerce, 
procedure and evidence, and more. These provisions, and the examples of their 
application by biblical kings and judges, are more useful and probative because they 
give more specific content, context, and coherence to the Decalogue and other 
statements of natural law. ‘[T]he moral commandments of the Decalogue are general’, 
Althusius wrote. ‘They have no certain, special, and fixed punishment attached to them’, 
let alone procedural mechanisms for how they should be justly and equitably interpreted 
and applied. The juridical law of Moses ‘makes more specific determinations, which it 
relates to the circumstances of the act’. So, while the natural law commands ‘that 













the bald commandment, ‘thou shalt not kill’, which cannot be just in all circumstances. 
The juridical law ‘works out specifically that adulterers, murderers, and the like are to be 
punished by death, unless the punishment should be mitigated on account of other 
circumstances. The Mosaic law has various punishments for these crimes’, and 
prescribes a number of useful procedures to weigh the evidence of the crime and to 
determine a just punishment.22 Similarly, the Mosaic juridical law offers a number of 
useful legal rules and procedures for the acquisition, use, and maintenance of public 
and private property, for the litigation and settlement of private disputes, and for the 
proper interactions between husband and wife, parent and child, master and servant, 
creditor and debtor, seller and buyer. None of these juridical positive laws of Moses 
should be considered binding upon modern day Christians just because they happen to 
be in the Bible. But insofar as they are parts and products of the natural law, these 
juridical laws are edifying for our day, and can be appropriated as apt in the construction 
of modern positive laws.23 
What underscored the natural validity and modern utility of the juridical laws of 
Moses was that they often had parallels in other legal systems, most notably in the 
classical Roman law distilled in the Corpus Iuris Civilis of Justinian. ‘Virtually all 
Europeans still use’ the classical Roman law, wrote Althusius, because its detailed laws 
have also proved to be ‘both right and useful.’24 To be sure, some ancient Roman law 
provisions betrayed the natural law more than illustrated it. Think of the many old laws 
celebrating the pagan imperial cult, the domestic laws that permitted infanticide, 
concubinage, and prostitution, the commercial laws that countenanced exploitation of 
orphans, captives, and slaves, and others. Such laws that openly contradict the 
Decalogue and other natural law principles cannot be viewed as binding on anyone, 
said Althusius. But the classical Roman law texts also hold numerous more enlightened 
legal teachings, many parallel to those in Mosaic juridical law, that are ‘consistent with 
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Roman laws have also been adopted and adapted into the canon laws of the medieval 
Church and the civil laws of early modern European nations. When these ancient 
Roman law texts and their later legal adaptations are interpreted and applied ‘naturally, 
equitably, and justly’, they, too, can be taken as reflections and illustrations of the 
universal natural law in action.25 
This was the method that Althusius used to work out an elaborate system of 
public, private, criminal, and procedural law for his day. He started with the natural law 
principles of Scripture and tradition. He then cited the elaboration of these principles in 
the precepts and procedures of various legal systems with an eye to discovering and 
demonstrating what they held in common. He combed very carefully through biblical law 
and classical Roman law. He rummaged more freely and selectively through medieval 
and early modern civil law, canon law, feudal law, manorial law, and urban law. The 
more frequently he found a legal principle, precept, procedure, or practice repeated in 
diverse sources, the more readily he held this up as a feature of a universal rule of law. 
Althusius did not take the next step that other early modern figures like Grotius and 
Pufendorf took in arguing for international and inter-state laws, treaties, and conventions 
based on these universal legal principles. He was content to demonstrate which laws 
were ‘universal rules’ and left it others to work them into the machinery of international 
law and inter-state diplomacy.   
A SYMBIOTIC THEORY OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS  
Althusius started his theory of society and politics, like his theory of law, with an 
account of the state of nature—now human nature, and more particularly the nature of 
persons as creatures and image bearers of God. God created humans as moral 
creatures, Althusius argued, with a natural law written on their hearts and consciences 
and ‘an innate inclination’, ‘hidden impulse’, and ‘natural instinct’ to be ‘just and law 
abiding’. God created persons as natural rights holders, vested with a natural 













bears from birth. God created persons as resilient creatures, with a natural capacity to 
preserve, protect, and reproduce themselves. God created humans as ‘virtuous’ and 
‘rational creatures’, who are called to pursue a ‘holy, just, comfortable, and happy’ life. 
God created persons as social creatures with a ‘symbiotic impulse for community’, ‘an 
instinct to live together with others and to establish civil society’. God created persons 
as loving creatures, who naturally need to give and to receive love in order to be fully 
human and to abide fully by the most primal command of the natural law: to love God, 
neighbor, and self. And God created persons as ‘language-bearers’, as ‘creatures of 
communication’, equipped to learn, teach, and develop the complex norms, habits, and 
gestures of proper communication and interaction in the home, church, state, school, 
business, and other associations.26 This was a far more complex anthropology than the 
bleak Hobbesian view of self-interested individuals driven by an ethic of self-
preservation to dangerous and destructive behavior unless coerced into political and 
social conformity by an all-powerful sovereign.  
Althusius distinguished three main types of associations that exist in most 
advanced civilizations: (1) private natural associations anchored in marriage and family 
ties; (2) private voluntary associations (collegia), such as corporations, guilds, 
businesses, charities, and more formed by related or unrelated parties; and (3) public or 
political associations—whether local (villages, towns, and cities), regional (duchies, 
provinces, and territories), or ‘universal’ (nations or empires). Each of these 
associations, he argued, is formed by a ‘tacit or explicit’ contract or covenant—a ‘bond 
of association and common agreement’ about the ‘property, work, and rights in 
common’ among the members of each association. By this ‘bond’, ‘contract’, or 
‘covenant’, the members agree to ‘communicate and share’ a portion of their property, 
work, and rights with other members of that association, ‘each fairly and properly 
according to his ability’. By so doing, each person’s multiple and unique needs are met 
so far as possible in the context of creating a community and common life. Althusius 













constitutions’ of the natural, voluntary, and political associations that together form a 
commonwealth.27  
Each of these founding agreements, he continued, is governed by a ‘general law 
of community, association, or symbiosis’ (lex communis, lex consociationis, lex 
symbiosis).28 This universal law of community teaches that in any such contractual 
association, some must be ruling authorities, others must be obedient subjects. The 
‘right to rule’ (ius majestatis) is assigned according to natural and intellectual ability, the 
duty to obey is accepted in accordance with individual and social need. Structures of 
authority and obedience are ‘unnatural’, Althusius believed, but they are ‘necessary’ for 
personal flourishing and social order. ‘By the natural law all men are equal and subject 
to the jurisdiction of no one, unless they subject themselves to another’s authority by 
their own consent and voluntary act, and transfer to another their rights.’ Most people 
agree, however, to transfer their rights and subject themselves to these ‘unnatural’ 
structures and strictures of authority, for they realize that without them even their most 
elementary associations will not long survive, and even their most basic rights will mean 
little.29  
The general law of association, however, puts basic limits on the activities of 
every authority—whether in the home, church, state, or other association. Every 
authority must rule ‘for the sake’ of his or her subjects—for the purpose of allowing them 
to seek their ultimate end of attaining a ‘holy, just, comfortable, and happy’ life. Every 
authority must care for the soul and the body of his or her subjects. Every authority must 
ensure that the ‘moral law’ is applied ‘equitably and justly’ within that association, 
always striving to balance firmness and fairness, rule and right, justice and mercy in 
accordance with the teachings of ‘natural equity’ (aequitas naturalis). Every authority 
must develop a body of proper internal laws (leges propriae) of the association tailored 
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its members. Every authority must put into ‘practice the common natural law’ which 
governs all persons, and must ‘indicate how individual members of that association are 
able to seek and attain the natural equity’ to which they are entitled.30 For Althusius, 
familial, private, and political associations alike were distinct spheres of law and love, 
justice and equity. Each association was grounded in the natural law and governed by 
the general law of associations. Each association, in turn, was a source of positive or 
proper law. Each made specific laws for the sake of achieving justice and equity for that 
association and protecting the rights and liberties of its members.  
Political Associations. In his full social theory, Althusius analyzed the private 
natural and voluntary associations in great detail, but let’s focus on the public political 
associations that are formed by covenants among these private (natural or voluntary) 
associations. The simplest such public political associations, and the earliest to develop, 
are hamlets and villages, then larger towns, counties, and cities. These small local 
associations eventually covenant together to form larger public associations—duchies, 
provinces, territories, or bishoprics. Not uncommonly, these intermediate public 
associations conjoin to form commonwealths, nations, or empires—‘universal public 
associations’, as Althusius called them.31 While he did not call this ‘inter-state’ or 
‘international law’ per se, these layers of ‘political covenants’ among independent 
sovereign political peers functioned in effect as international agreements.   
While this political evolution from private to public political associations can be 
seen in the history of many peoples, for Althusius the ‘earliest’, ‘best’, ‘wisest’, and ‘most 
perfect example’ was recorded in the political history of biblical Israel.32 The Israelite 
people moved from the marital household of Abraham and Sarah to the extended 
families of Isaac and Jacob, then to the twelve tribes founded by Jacob’s twelve 
children, then to the towns and cities led by Joshua and the later Judges, and finally to a 
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political evolution of Israel was forged by a ‘consensual covenant’ between the rulers 
and the people, with God presiding as third party governor and guarantor. When the 
people and their families and tribes needed judges to govern their new cities, God 
commanded them: ‘You shall establish judges and moderators in all your gates that the 
Lord gave you through your tribes, who shall judge the people with righteous judgment’ 
(Deuteronomy 16:18). When the tribes later came together to form the nation of Israel, 
they entered into covenant with King David. The Bible recorded this critical final step of 
Israel’s political evolution as follows:  
Then all the tribes of Israel came to David at Hebron, and 
said, ‘Behold, we are your flesh and bone. In times past, 
when Saul was king over us, it was you that led out and 
brought in Israel; and the Lord said to you, You shall be 
shepherd of my people Israel, and you shall be prince over 
Israel.’ So all the elders of Israel came to the king at Hebron; 
and King David made a covenant with them at Hebron 
before the Lord, and they anointed David king over Israel. (II 
Samuel 5:1–3; Deut. 17:14–15) 
These same political covenant ceremonies were repeated anew with King 
Solomon, King Rehoboam, and others (1 Kings 1:34–40, 12:1–20). 
Althusius recited this biblical history and sundry other political histories to draw 
out lessons for the development of a just and stable legal and political order. One 
lesson was that both biblical and natural law condone the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty, which he defined as the natural right and power of the people to rule 
themselves or to elect representatives to rule on their behalf. ‘God has formed in all 
peoples by the natural law itself the free power to constitute princes, kings, and 
magistrates for themselves’, he wrote.  
This means that, insofar as any commonwealth that is 
divinely instructed by the law of nature has civil power, it can 
transfer this power to another or others, who, under the title 
of kings, princes, consuls, or other magistrates, assume the 









This natural right to self-rule is so powerful and universal that even God Himself 
respected this right when the ancient Israelites insisted on its vindication. ‘God 
marvelously governed this people for about four hundred years as if he himself were 
their king’, wrote Althusius. And God had the perfect natural right, as the Creator of the 
law of nature, to rule the Israelites permanently as their king. But ‘the people requested 
their own king. God was at first indignant and gave them Saul, whom God designated 
and immediately chose himself’ and whom he crowned through the services of his 
prophet Samuel. But the people did not welcome Saul. They wanted another king, 
David, to serve in his stead. God yielded to their choice. ‘By his word, he established 
the descendents of David in the control of the realm. But God performed these actions 
in such a way that the people were not excluded from giving their consent and 
approval.’ While God helped to coronate these earthly kings to rule in his stead, ‘the 
kings were considered to be chosen by the people as well, and to receive from them the 
right to rule as king (ius regis)’ on behalf of the people.33 
If even God yielded to the natural right of the people to select their own political 
rulers, then surely every earthly ruler must yield to this natural right as well. ‘Rulers are 
made for the people, not people for the rulers’, Althusius wrote. ‘The people can exist 
without the ruler, but the ruler cannot exist without the people.’ ‘By nature and 
circumstance the people are prior to, and more important than, and superior to their 
rulers.’ The people elect rulers for the sake of delegating to them the administration of 
laws that they cannot manage easily on their own. These rulers must act on the 
people’s behalf, and with the interest of the people in mind. They can exercise no more 
authority over the people than the people can exercise over themselves, and no more 
authority than the people have explicitly delegated to these rulers. In particular, rulers 
may not trespass natural laws or natural rights any more than the people can. And they 
may never convert their political office into an instrument for ‘their personal and private 













abuse, Althusius insisted that no atheist, heretic, or bastard, and nobody who was 
impious, impish, or immoral be allowed to serve in political office.34  
A second lesson was that political associations, like natural and private 
associations, must be formed by voluntary covenants or contracts sworn by the people 
and their rulers before God. Althusius described these political covenants as mutual 
promises by the people and their rulers to uphold the laws of God and nature, the 
natural rights and liberties of the people, and the faith and order of the community. The 
rulers swear an oath of office before the people and before God to ‘administer the realm 
or commonwealth according to laws prescribed by God, right reason, and the body of 
the commonwealth’. They swear to ‘bear and represent the person of the entire realm, 
of all subjects thereof, and of God from whom all power derives’. They swear to 
maintain the soul and body, piety and justice, faith and order of the people and the 
community. The people, in turn, by ‘common consent’, promise to ‘bind themselves to 
obey and comply with the supreme magistrate who administers the commonwealth 
according to prescribed laws’ so long as those positive laws ‘do not conflict with the law 
of God and the right of the realm’. They further promise to accord legitimate magistrates 
their ‘trust, compliance, service, aid, and counsel,’ to pray for the magistrates’ survival, 
wisdom, flourishing, and happiness, to pay their taxes, to register their properties, to 
answer their conscriptions, and to oblige all other just laws and orders that cater to the 
peace, order, and happiness of the commonwealth.35  
Althusius distinguished various types, phases, or dimensions of the political 
covenant. The first was the agreement among the people themselves who, directly or 
through their representatives, chose to form a political association regardless of its type 
of government. The second was between the rulers and the people, by which each side 
defined the forms and norms of government of the political association, and their 
respective duties and rights, powers and privileges therein. The third was between the 
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secured the blessings of liberty for the people and their associations. The fourth was 
between the chief magistrate and the lower magistrates, by which each side agreed to 
check and balance the other as a safeguard against tyranny. For Althusius all these 
agreements together served as the ‘fundamental law’, ‘founding constitution’, and 
‘contractual mandate’ of the political community.36  
Althusius regarded political covenants—at the urban, provincial, and national 
levels alike—as the best guarantee of the ‘ultimate rule of laws (leges) and rights (iura) 
in human society’. ‘Rule by law’ and ‘rules of law’ grounded in the law of nature and 
enumerated and bounded by the political covenant, he thought, provided the 
commonwealth with ‘a guiding light of civil life, a scale of justice, a preserver of liberty, a 
bulwark of public peace and discipline, a refuge for the weak, a bridle for the powerful, a 
norm and straightener of rulership’. For Althusius, these political covenants were not 
just mythical, metaphysical, or metaphorical constructs. They were to be written 
charters and constitutions, to which the rulers and the people solemnly swore their 
allegiance before God. They specified in detail the mutual rights and duties, powers and 
prerogatives of the rulers and the people, and the principles and procedures for the 
creation and enforcement of positive laws. ‘Written constitutions’, he wrote, provide the 
best ‘fences, walls, guards, or boundaries of our life, guiding us along the appointed 
way for achieving wisdom, happiness, and peace in human society.’37  
These written constitutions must make clear that, at every level of government, 
the people remain sovereign and supreme; they retain their fundamental rights as 
persons and as members of private associations. Even the ‘right of national sovereignty’ 
belongs ultimately to the people as a whole, not to any person within it—especially not 
to any king or other supreme ruler who happens to occupy their political office. All the 
people who constitute the nation are literally, said Althusius, the ‘owners of the nation’s 
rights of sovereignty’. Through the creation of the national covenant, or constitution, the 














or royal office. Because of this delegation, ‘the king represents the people, not the 
people the king’. The king must be responsible to the people, represented in their 
various associations.  
The right of a king consists in the faithful and diligent care and 
administration of the commonwealth entrusted to him by the 
people.... The king holds, uses, and enjoys these riches ... as 
a usufructuary [a leaseholder]. When the king dies, or is 
denied the royal throne by legitimate means, these rights of 
the king return to the people, the owner [of these rights]. The 
people then reassign them as it thinks best for the good of the 
commonwealth. Therefore the right of the king is one thing, 
the right of the people another. The former is temporary and 
personal; the latter is permanent. The former is lesser, the 
latter greater. The former is a loan given by contract to the 
authorized king, the latter is an indivisible property [owned by 
the people].38  
 
Not only do the people retain their fundamental sovereignty and rights; the lower 
political associations also retain their fundamental identity and sovereignty as parts of 
these broader political structures. Each local political association retains it own ‘right of 
sovereignty’ (ius majestatis), its own ‘rights, privileges, benefits, and prerogatives’ that 
the people have delegated to them. This is the political power to exercise personal and 
subject matter jurisdiction within that political association, to undertake legal actions on 
behalf of and for the sake of the members, to ‘dispose, prescribe, ordain, administer 
everything necessary and useful’ for the maintenance and flourishing of the political 
association and the people. Of course, a city’s right of sovereignty is subject to that of 
the higher provinces and nation, just as a province’s right of sovereignty is subject to the 
highest sovereignty of the nation. But these local political rights of sovereignty remain in 













the administration of authority, the more ‘individualized the care that is given to the 
individuals and groups’. The agreement of a city to join a province, or of a city and 
province to join a larger national republic, does not end their political identity or 
sovereignty, but confirms it. It guarantees representation of their local interests in higher 
politics and assures them of protection and support in the event of attack or emergency. 
It further confirms that the higher political associations are created by and composed of 
these smaller associations, and ultimately dependent upon them for their survival. 
Lower political associations are the essential foundations of higher political 
associations, without which a province or nation-state would crumble.39  
Althusius’s insistence on preserving local political sovereignty, even while 
defending the rights and powers of a sovereign nation-state, was a critical argument in 
the defense of the Dutch confederacy of his day, and eventually in the development of 
the modern theory of political federalism. It also had strong implications for sorting out 
the complex political relationships of various polities in the Holy Roman Empire of his 
day, not least the city of Emden, and various inter-state and international relations, too. 
His views stood in marked contrast with the theories of royal absolutism and nationalist 
sovereignty propounded by Jean Bodin, James I, and others whom Althusius roundly 
dismissed as misguided. For Althusius, sovereignty was a universal blessing vested in 
all the people in their particular associations, not an indivisible prerogative vested 
exclusively in a hereditary monarch. Federalism was an essential guarantee of the 
sovereignty of the people, and the lower private and political associations that they 
inhabited, a buffer against the inevitable tendencies of higher magistrates toward 
political tyranny and nationalist absolutism.  
Federalism was not the only such safeguard. Separation of powers served that 
function as well. Althusius called for a ‘mixed government’ that combined monarchical, 
aristocratic, and democratic elements but that separated executive, legislative, and 
judicial powers. Each power should enjoy a measure of control over and dependence 













particularly the fundamental law that brings these powers into being. All powers and 
authorities should exercise ‘moderation’ ‘so that the right of each member of the 
commonwealth is conserved, and neither diminished nor increased to the detriment of 
another.’ It is especially important to ensure ‘that the power of the king is not so 
enhanced that the liberty of the people is suppressed’.40 Althusius worked out in detail 
the layers of urban, provincial, and national offices that discharged these powers, and 
the particular procedures, purposes, and prerogatives that attached to each. He 
devoted a good deal of his Politics to this huge analytical task, focusing especially on 
the respective powers of the executive and legislative offices over religion and morality, 
rights and liberties, education and welfare, war and crime, property and contracts, 
taxation and commerce, money and titles, diplomacy and negotiation, and more.41 His 
Theory of Justice added several long chapters on the judicial power and the rules of 
evidence and procedures, pleading and appeal, representation and advocacy that 
obtain therein.42  
Checks and balances were yet another safeguard against political excesses at 
the local, provincial, and national levels. Particularly noteworthy were the heightened 
powers and roles that Althusius assigned to the ‘ephors’ in ensuring the separation and 
cooperation of powers and the effective and efficient administration of the republic. The 
ephors were no longer the vaguely defined ‘inferior magistrates’ and ‘emergency 
officers’ that John Calvin had introduced into Reformed political thought in his 1536 
Institutes of the Christian Religion. Althusius’s ephors were critical officers called to 
exercise a range of legislative and executive powers at the urban, provincial, and 
national levels of government. Reflecting some of the political complexities of the Holy 
Roman Empire in his day, Althusius distinguished among various types of ephors and 
the responsibilities of each. Some ephors were hereditary and permanent, some elected 
and temporary. Some were clerical appointees with assigned ecclesiastical roles, others 
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whole national realm, others had power only over local provinces and cities. The most 
important common task of all the ephors was to ‘administer, govern, and conserve the 
body and rights’ of the individual provinces and of the individual cities, guilds, estates, 
and private associations that constituted the provinces. Althusius thus called ephors the 
‘rectors, governors, directors, administrators, regents, pastors, leaders, deliverers, and 
fathers’ of the realm. The ephors with national jurisdiction were also called to elect and 
constitute the nation’s supreme magistrate. They were to advise the supreme 
magistrate and give their consent to all his general laws. They were to stand in for him if 
and as needed. They were to defend him when he was unjustly attacked. They were to 
contain and control him—‘restraining and impeding his freedom in undertakings that are 
wicked and ruinous to the commonwealth, in containing him within the limits of his 
office, and finally in fully providing and caring for the commonwealth’. They were to 
resist and depose him if he became a tyrant.43 
Tyranny. Althusius’ detailed account of law, rights, society, and politics made the 
definition of tyranny rather straightforward to him. A tyrant, he said, is one who ‘violates, 
changes, overthrows, or destroys’ ‘the fundamental law and rights’ (lex et jura 
fundamentalis)’ of the commonwealth or ‘the natural laws and rights’ (leges et iura 
naturali) on which the fundamental laws and rights are based.44 Althusius dutifully 
recited the shopworn arguments for resistance to tyranny that earlier Protestant and 
Catholic writers had offered. The Bible’s calls to obey ‘the powers ordained by God’ 
always presuppose that these rulers are legitimate representatives of God. Tyrants who 
offend God and defy true religion are no longer God’s agents, and must be removed 
both for God’s sake and for the people’s sake. Tyrants forfeit their political offices and 
become private persons against whom the natural rights of self-defense can apply. The 
people must always consent to their rulers, and they would not and could not consent to 
a tyrant. Tyrants are those who violate the people’s ancient charters and privileges, 
which charters sometimes condition a ruler’s legitimacy on compliance with its terms 
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tolerated who threatens to smash the ship of state on the rocks. History is full of 
examples of courageous leaders who have stood up to tyrants. Althusius also recited 
the traditional rules and rationales for leaving the judgment and execution of resistance 
to designated ephors and other officers rather than to the crowd. Wild insurrection will 
ensue if private persons are left free to judge and resist tyrants on their own. We must 
leave these judgments to constitutional authorities who can judge both whether an 
official has become tyrannical and what remedies are apt for a ruler judged to be 
tyrannical—reprimand, restriction, removal, revolt, or regicide. All these and other 
arguments were well known in contemporary Protestant and Catholic circles, and 
Althusius peppered his account with citations to all manner of authorities in support.45  
Althusius’ more distinct contribution was to show that tyranny is in its essence a 
‘constitutional violation’—a violation of the political covenant by which the polity itself 
was constituted, a violation of the constitutional duties of the rulers and the fundamental 
rights of the people as set out in this political covenant, and even more fundamentally a 
violation of the natural law and natural rights that undergird and empower all 
constitutions and covenants. For Althusius, a tyrant was a magistrate who acted 
‘illegally and unnaturally’ (contra legem et naturam) in breach of the contractual and 
covenantal duties that he or she swore to God and to the people. Tyranny existed 
wherever any ‘egregious’, ‘chronic’, ‘persistent’, ‘pervasive’, ‘willful’, ‘intentional’, and 
‘widespread’ breach of a ruler’s constitutional duties, abuse of constitutional powers, 
neglect of constitutional offices, usurpation of another’s constitutional office, or violation 
of the people’s constitutional rights. Of course, ‘not every such misdeed by a magistrate 
deprives him of his scepter’, Althusius cautioned. ‘A marriage is not dissolved by a 
misdeed committed by one mate against another—unless it is a misdeed like adultery, 
which runs directly contrary to the very nature of marriage.’ Likewise, a political 
association is not dissolved just by any official misstep. But dissolution may well occur 
when the magistrate’s tyrannical conduct runs ‘contrary to the fundamentals and 














bonds of the associated body of the commonwealth,’ or ‘destroys civil or political life ... 
and the most important goods of the commonwealth, such as its peace, order, virtue, 
law, and nobility.’ ‘Is there not equal reason for conceding divorce between a king and a 
commonwealth because of the intolerable and incurable cruelty of a king by which all 
honest cohabitation and association with him are destroyed?’46 
With that formula in hand, Althusius worked through all the essential 
constitutional powers and duties that each executive, legislative, and judicial authority at 
each level of government had to discharge. He focused especially on government 
powers relating to peace and order, war and diplomacy, crime and delicts, taxation and 
commerce, property and money, banking and commerce, religion and morality, 
education and welfare. Egregious, chronic, persistent, pervasive, and intentional abuse, 
misuse, or neglect of these powers to the ‘grave detriment’ of the commonwealth were 
all potential cases of tyranny to Althusius. Such magisterial conduct must, at minimum, 
empower private subjects to engage in non-violent disobedience and public ephors to 
institute constitutional remedies.47 In more serious cases, it allowed for sanctions, 
restrictions, or removal of the offending magistrates, even revolutionary revamping of 
the government as a whole.  
Another egregious form of tyranny was the systematic ‘violation or abridgement 
of the rights of the members of the community and their associations’. Althusius singled 
out for special emphasis governmental conduct that violated the people’s natural 
rights—that ‘impeded orthodox religious exercise’, that abolished schools and 
education, that ‘chronically neglected the sick, poor, and innocent,’ or that ‘consistently 
abused private individuals’ in their lives and bodies, their lands and goods, their 
standing and reputations, their homes and relatives, their contracts and associations. All 
of these ‘rights and duties given by God are older and more powerful’ than any of those 
set out in the written constitution or political covenant. ‘Even if they are not made explicit 
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‘must be understood to be in effect. God is superior to and master of both the rulers and 
the people’, and the rights and duties set out in the natural law must take precedence 
over all others. Moreover, the political covenant ‘between the people and their ruler 
does not create duties that are superior to those which exist between ... a wife and a 
husband, children and parents, master and servant, patron and client’, and other such 
natural associations. With respect to these private associations, the law of the state 
serves only to ‘deter and punish dishonest, immoral, or unholy people ... who subvert 
these existing structures of authority or [legitimate] holders of power within them’. When 
state authorities themselves subvert these social structures, resistance is both natural 
and necessary.48  
Althusius also focused on violations of the procedural rights of the people. He 
listed violations of a number of important criminal procedural rights—false arrests, 
accusations, indictments, and sentences of innocent parties, false imprisonment or 
protracted pre-trial incarceration, torture, starvation, or enslavement of prisoners, use of 
anonymous indictments and untested evidence, denial of rights to defend oneself, to 
have counsel, to examine hostile witness, to introduce exculpatory evidence, or even to 
have one's day in court following prescribed procedures, imposition of extraordinary 
tribunals or ex post facto laws, use of biased, bribed, or incompetent judges, imposition 
of unjust, inequitable, or widely variant punishments, failure to grant appeals of motions, 
judgments, or sentences, excessive fines, cruel punishments, and more. Each of these 
abuses and violations of procedural rights should give individual victims constitutional 
redress, Althusius argued, and a persistent pattern of such abuses to several victims at 
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Drawing on a vast array of biblical, classical, Catholic, and Protestant sources, 
Althusius systematized and greatly expanded many of the core political and legal 
teachings of the Calvinist tradition of which he was a leading member—that the republic 
is formed by a covenant between the rulers and the people before God, that the 
foundation of this covenant is the law of God and nature, that the Decalogue is the best 
expression of this higher law, that church and state are separate in form but conjoined 
in function, that families, churches, and states alike must protect the rights and liberties 
of the people, and that violations of these rights and liberties, or of the divine and 
natural laws that inform and empower them, are instances of tyranny that must trigger 
organized constitutional resistance. 
Althusius added a number of other core ideas to this Calvinist inheritance. He 
developed a natural law theory that still treated the Decalogue as the best source and 
summary of natural law but layered its Commandments with all manner of new biblical, 
classical, and Christian teachings. He developed a theory of positive law that judged the 
validity and utility of any human law, including the positive laws of Moses and the canon 
laws of the church, against both the natural law of Scripture and tradition and the 
fundamental law of the state. He called for a detailed written constitution as the 
fundamental law of the community and called for perennial protection of ‘the rule of law’ 
and ‘rule of rights’ in every political community. He developed an expansive theory of 
popular sovereignty as an expression of the divine sovereignty that each person reflects 
as an image bearer of God. He developed a detailed and refined theory of natural 
rights—religious and social, public and private, substantive and procedural, contractual 
and proprietary. He demonstrated at great length how each of these rights was 
predicated on the Decalogue and other forms of natural law, and how each was to be 
protected by public, private, and criminal laws and procedures promulgated by the state. 
Particularly striking was his call for religious toleration and absolute liberty of conscience 
for all as a natural corollary and consequence of the Calvinist teaching of the absolute 
sovereignty of God whose relationship with his creatures could not be trespassed.  
More striking still was Althusius’s ‘symbiotic theory’ of human nature and 
‘covenantal theory’ of society and politics. While acknowledging the traditional Calvinist 
teaching of the total depravity of persons, Althusius emphasized that God has created 









completely fulfilled through symbiotic relationships with others in which they can 
appropriately share their bodies and souls, their lives and spirits, their belongings and 
rights. Thus, while persons are born free, equal, and individual, they are by nature and 
necessity inclined to form associations—marriages and families, clubs and corporations, 
cities and provinces, nation-states and empires. Each of these associations, from the 
tiniest household to the vastest empire, is formed by a mutually consensual covenant or 
contract sworn by all members of that association before each other and God. Each 
association is a locus of authority and liberty that binds both rulers and subjects to the 
terms of their founding contract and to the commands of the foundational laws of God 
and nature. Each association confirms and protects the sovereignty and identity of its 
constituent members as well as their natural rights and liberties. 
Althusius applied this Christian social contract theory most fully in his description 
of the state. Using the political history of ancient Israel as his best example, he showed 
historically and philosophically how nation-states develop gradually from families to 
tribes to cities to provinces to nations to empires. Each new layer of political sovereignty 
is formed by covenants sworn before God by representatives of the smaller units, and 
these covenants eventually become the written constitutions of the polity. The 
constitutions define and divide the executive, legislative, and judicial offices within that 
polity, and govern the relations of its rulers and subjects, clerics and magistrates, 
associations and individuals. They determine the relations between and among nations, 
provinces, and cities, and between and among private and public associations-- all of 
which Althusius called a form of ‘federalism’ (from ‘foedus,’ the Latin term for covenant). 
The constitutions also make clear the political acts and omissions that constitute tyranny 
and the procedures and remedies available to those who are abused. Althusius 
produced the most comprehensive Calvinist legal and political theory of law, and many 
of his insights anticipated teachings that would become axiomatic for Western 
constitutionalism and human rights. 
